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Abstract—Dynamic frequency and voltage scaling features
have been introduced to manage ever-growing heat and power
consumption in modern processors. Design restrictions ensure
frequency and voltage are adjusted as a pair, based on the
current load, because for each frequency there is only a certain
voltage range where the processor can operate correctly. For
this purpose, many processors (including the widespread Intel
Core series) expose privileged software interfaces to dynamically
regulate processor frequency and operating voltage.
In this paper, we demonstrate that these privileged interfaces
can be reliably exploited to undermine the system’s security. We
present the Plundervolt attack, in which a privileged software
adversary abuses an undocumented Intel Core voltage scaling in-
terface to corrupt the integrity of Intel SGX enclave computations.
Plundervolt carefully controls the processor’s supply voltage
during an enclave computation, inducing predictable faults within
the processor package. Consequently, even Intel SGX’s mem-
ory encryption/authentication technology cannot protect against
Plundervolt. In multiple case studies, we show how the induced
faults in enclave computations can be leveraged in real-world
attacks to recover keys from cryptographic algorithms (including
the AES-NI instruction set extension) or to induce memory safety
vulnerabilities into bug-free enclave code. We finally discuss why
mitigating Plundervolt is not trivial, requiring trusted computing
base recovery through microcode updates or hardware changes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The security of modern systems builds on abstractions of
the underlying hardware. However, hardware is subject to
physical effects and is increasingly optimized to meet the ever-
growing need for performance and efficiency. Modern CPUs
are highly optimized such that performance and efficiency
are maximized while maintaining functional correctness under
specified working conditions.
In fact, many modern processors cannot permanently run at
their maximum clock frequencies because it would consume
significant power that, in turn, produces too much heat (e.g.,
in a data center). Additionally, in mobile devices, high power
consumption drains the battery quickly.
This voltage and frequency dependency of the (dynamic)
power consumption Pdyn of a CMOS circuit is expressed as:
Pdyn ∝ f · V 2, i.e., the dynamic power consumption is
proportional to the clock frequency f and to the square of the
supply voltage V
Because of this relationship (and other factors), modern
processors keep the clock frequency and supply voltage as
low as possible—only dynamically scaling up when necessary.
Higher frequencies require higher voltages for the proces-
sor to function correctly, so they should not be changed
independently. Additionally, there are other types of power
consumption that influence the best choice of a frequency/
voltage pair for specific situations.
Lowering the supply voltage was also important in the
development of the last generations of DRAM. The sup-
ply voltage has been gradually reduced, resulting in smaller
charges in the actual capacitors storing the single bits—this
led to the well-known Rowhammer [41] effect. Exploiting
this, a long line of research has mounted practical attacks,
e.g., for privilege escalation [60, 22, 77, 74], injecting faults
into cryptographic primitives [55, 6], or reading otherwise
inaccessible memory locations [44]. While fault attacks have
been extensively studied for adversaries with physical access
to embedded devices [7, 62, 2, 26], Rowhammer remains, to
date, the only known purely software-based fault attack on
x86-based systems. Hence, both the scientific community and
industry have put significant effort in developing Rowhammer
mitigations [41, 37, 27, 3, 23, 53, 12, 79, 13, 74, 22, 10].
This has reached a point where Intel ultimately considers main
memory as an untrusted storage facility and fully encrypts
and authenticates all memory within the Intel SGX enclave
security architecture [24]. But is authentication and encryption
of memory enough to safeguard the integrity of general-
purpose computations?
To answer this question, we investigate interfaces for supply
voltage optimizations on x86 Intel Core CPUs. With shrink-
ing process technology, the processor supply voltages have
gradually been reduced to make systems more efficient. At
the same time, voltage margins (the stable voltage ranges
for each frequency) have shrunk. The actual voltage margin
is strongly influenced by imperfections in the manufacturing
process and also the specific system setup, including the
voltage regulator on the main board. Since these dynamic
voltage and frequency scaling features are undocumented and
only exposed to privileged system software, they have been
scarcely studied from a security perspective. However, this is
very relevant in the context of SGX. Intel SGX enclaves are
currently considered immune to fault attacks. In particular,
Rowhammer, the only software-based fault attack known to
work on x86 processors, simply causes the integrity check of
the Memory Encryption Engine (MEE) to fail [21, 38], halting
the entire system.
A. Related Work on Software-based Fault Attacks
A fault attack manipulates the computations of a device
with the purpose of bypassing its security mechanisms or
leaking its secrets. With this aim, the attacker manipulates
the environment to influence the target device’s computations.
Typically such fault-inducing environments are at the border
of (or beyond) the specified operational range of the target
device. Different environment manipulations have been inves-
tigated [26], such as: exposure to voltage and clock glitch-
ing [2, 62], extreme temperatures [29] or laser/UV light [63].
Software-based fault attacks shift the threat model from a
local attacker (with physical access to the target device) to a
potentially remote attacker with only local code execution.
Initially, these attacks were interesting in scenarios where
the attacker is unprivileged or even sandboxed. However,
with secure execution technologies, such as: Intel SGX, ARM
TrustZone and AMD SEV, privileged attackers must also be
considered as they are part of the corresponding threat models.
In 2017, Tang et al. [65] discovered a software-based fault
attack, dubbed CLKscrew. They discovered that ARM pro-
cessors allow configuration of the dynamic frequency scaling
feature, i.e., overclocking, by system software. Tang et al.
show that overclocking features may be abused to jeopardize
the integrity of computations for privileged adversaries in a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Based on this obser-
vation, they were able to attack cryptographic code running in
TrustZone. They used their attack to extract cryptographic keys
from a custom AES software implementation and to overcome
RSA signature checks and subsequently execute their own
program in the TrustZone of the System-on-Chip (SoC) on
a Nexus 6 device.
However, their attack is specific to TrustZone on a certain
ARM SoC and not directly applicable to SGX on Intel proces-
sors. In fact, it is unclear whether similar effects exist on x86-
based computers, whether they are exploitable, and whether
the processor package or SGX has protections against this
type of attack, e.g., machine-check errors on the system level,
or data integrity validation in SGX enclaves. Furthermore,
CLKscrew is based on changing the frequency, while in this
paper we focus on voltage manipulations. Finally, the question
arises whether faults are limited to software implementations
of cryptographic algorithms (as in CLKscrew), or can also be
used to exploit hardware implementations (like AES-NI) or
generic (non-crypto) code.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we present Plundervolt, a novel attack against
Intel SGX to reliably corrupt enclave computations by abusing
privileged dynamic voltage scaling interfaces. Our work builds
on reverse engineering efforts that revealed which Model-
Specific Registers (MSRs) are used to control the dynamic
voltage scaling from software [64, 57, 49]. The respective
MSRs exist on all Intel Core processors. Using this interface
to very briefly decrease the CPU voltage during a computation
in a victim SGX enclave, we show that a privileged adversary
is able to inject faults into protected enclave computations.
Crucially, since the faults happen within the processor pack-
age, i.e., before the results are committed to memory, Intel
SGX’s memory integrity protection fails to defend against our
attacks. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
practically showcase an attack that directly breaches SGX’s
integrity guarantees.
In summary, our main contributions are:
1) We present Plundervolt, a novel software-based fault
attack on Intel Core x86 processors. For the first time,
we bypass Intel SGX’s integrity guarantees by directly
injecting faults within the processor package.
2) We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks by inject-
ing faults into Intel’s RSA-CRT and AES-NI implementa-
tions running in an SGX enclave, and we reconstruct full
cryptographic keys with negligible computational efforts.
3) We explore the use of Plundervolt to induce memory
safety errors into bug-free enclave code. Through various
case studies, we show how in-enclave pointers can be
redirected into untrusted memory and how Plundervolt
may cause heap overflows in widespread SGX runtimes.
4) Finally, we discuss countermeasures and why fully miti-
gating Plundervolt may be challenging in practice.
C. Responsible Disclosure
We have responsibly disclosed our findings to Intel on June
7, 2019. Intel has reproduced and confirmed the vulnerabili-
ties which they are tracking under CVE-2019-11157. Intel’s
mitigation is provided in Section VII-C.
Our current results indicate that the Plundervolt attack
affects all SGX-enabled Intel Core processors from Skylake
onward. We have also experimentally confirmed the existence
of the undervolting interface on pre-SGX Intel Core proces-
sors. However, for such non-SGX processors, Plundervolt does
not currently represent a security threat in our assessment,
because the interface is exclusively available to privileged
users. Furthermore, in virtualized environments, hypervisors
should never allow untrusted guest VMs to read from or write
to undocumented MSRs.
We have made our PoC attack code available at: https://
github.com/KitMurdock/plundervolt.
D. Structure of the Paper
Section II presents the attacker model, our experimental
setup and the tested CPUs. In Section III, we present the basic
working principle of the Plundervolt attack when targeting
multiplications, with a detailed analysis of the fault character-
istics in Section III-A. Section IV shows how Plundervolt can
be used to recover cryptographic keys from RSA and AES-NI
implementations running inside an SGX enclave. In Section V,
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Fig. 1. Layout of the undocumented undervolting MSR with address 0x150.
we discuss how Plundervolt can be used to induce memory
safety vulnerabilities into bug-free code. In Section VI, we
discuss the Plundervolt attack w.r.t. related work, while Sec-




We assume the standard Intel SGX adversary model where
the attacker has full control over all software running outside
the enclave (including privileged system software such as op-
erating system and BIOS). Crucial for our attacks is the ability
for a root adversary to read/write MSRs, e.g., through a mali-
cious ring 0 kernel module or an attack framework like SGX-
Step [71]. Since we only exploit software-accessible interfaces,
our attacks can be mounted by remote adversaries who gained
arbitrary kernel code execution, but without physical access to
the target machine. At the hardware level, we assume a recent
Intel Core processor with (i) Intel SGX enclave technology,
and (ii) dynamic voltage scaling technology. In practice, we
found these requirements to be fulfilled by all Intel Core
processors we tested from Skylake onward (cf. Table I).
B. Voltage Scaling on Intel Core Processors
We build on the reverse engineering efforts of [64, 49, 57]
that revealed the existence of an undocumented MSR to adjust
operating voltage on Intel Core CPUs. To ensure reproducibil-
ity of our findings, we document this concealed interface in
detail. All results were experimentally confirmed on our test
platforms (cf. Table I).
Figure 1 shows how the 64-bit value in MSR 0x150 can be
decomposed into a plane index and a voltage offset. Firstly, by
specifying a valid plane index, system software can select to
which CPU components the under- or overvolting should be
applied. The CPU core and cache share the same voltage plane
on all machines we tested and the higher voltage of both will
be applied to the shared plane. Secondly, the requested voltage
scaling offset is encoded as an 11-bit signed integer relative
to the core’s base operating voltage. This value is expressed
in units of 1/1024 V (about 1 mV), thus allowing a maximum
voltage offset of ±1V.
After software has successfully submitted a voltage scaling
request, it takes some time before the actual voltage transition
is physically applied. The current operating voltage can be
queried from the documented MSR 0x198 (IA32_PERF_STA
TUS). We experimentally verified that all physical CPUs share
the same voltage plane (i.e., scaling voltage on one core also
adjusts all the other physical CPU cores).
From Skylake onwards, the voltage regulator is external to
the CPU as a separate chip on the main board. The CPU
requests a supply voltage change, which is then transferred
to and executed by the regulator chip. In Intel systems, this
is implemented as follows (based on datasheets for respective
voltage regulator chips [30] and older, public Intel documen-
tation [31]):
1) The CPU outputs an 8-bit value “VID”, encoding the
currently requested voltage, to the voltage regulator on
the mainboard. Based on CPU datasheets (Table 6-11
in [33]), it appears this value is transferred over a three-
wire serial link called “Serial VID” or “SVID”, comprised
of the pins VIDSOUT, VIDSCK, and VIDALERT#. Pre-
sumably, the offset in MSR 0x150 is subtracted from the
base value within the CPU logic before outputting a VID
code; however it is unclear why MSR 0x150 is in steps
of 1/1024 V, while the 8-bit VID allegedly uses steps of
5 mV [30].
2) Based on the VID, the voltage regulator chip adjusts the
voltage supplied via the core voltage pins (VCC) to the
CPU. Note that there are configuration options for the
slew rate i.e., the time taken for a specific voltage change
to occur (fastest rate in [30] is given as 80 mV/µs), as well
as limits on overshoot and undershoot.
C. Configuring Voltage and Frequency
In order to reliably find a faulty frequency/voltage pair, we
configured the CPU to run at a fixed frequency. This step can
be easily executed using documented Intel frequency scaling
interfaces, e.g., through the script given in Appendix A.
The undervolting is applied by writing to the concealed
MSR 0x150 (e.g., using the msr Linux kernel module) just
before entering the victim enclave through an ECALL in the
untrusted host program. After returning from the enclave, the
host program immediately reverts to a stable operating voltage.
Note that, apart from the msr kernel module, attackers can also
rely on more precise methods to control undervolting, e.g.,
if configuration latency should be minimized. For this, we
have extended the SGX-Step [71] enclave execution control
framework with x86 interrupt and call gate functionality so
as to be able to execute the privileged rdmsr and wrmsr
instructions directly before entering a victim enclave.
One challenge for a successful Plundervolt attack is to
establish the correct undervolting parameter such that the
processor produces incorrect results for certain instructions,
while still allowing the remaining code base to function
normally. That is, undervolting too far leads to system crashes
and freezes, while undervolting too little does not produce any
faults. Finding the right undervolting value therefore requires
some experimentation by carefully reducing the core voltage
in small decrements (e.g., by 1 mV per step) until a fault
occurs, but before the system crashes. In practice, we found
that it suffices to undervolt for short periods of time by -100
to -260 mV, depending on the specific CPU, frequency and
temperature (see Section III-A for a more precise analysis).
D. Undervolting Decline Micro-benchmark
To study how quickly writes to MSR 0x150 manifest in
actual changes to the core voltage, we performed a micro-
benchmark where we continuously read the reported current
CPU voltage from MSR 0x198 (IA32_PERF_STATUS). We
executed the micro-benchmark code by means of a privileged
x86 interrupt gate that first applies -100 mV undervolting and
then immediately executes a tight loop of 300 iterations to
collect pairs of measurements of the current processor voltage
and the associated Time Stamp Counter (TSC) value.
Fig. 2. Voltage decline over time for Intel i3-7100U-C, repeating a -100 mV
undervolting seven times and measuring actual voltage in MSR 0x198.
Figure 2 displays the measurement results for seven rep-
etitions of a -100 mV drop. It is immediately evident that
there is a substantial delay (between 500k and 1M TSC
ticks) between the MSR change and the actual undervolting
being applied. While some of this delay might be due to the
software-based measurement via MSR 0x198, our benchmark
primarily reveals that voltage changes incur a non-negligible
overhead. We will come back to this point in Section VII
when devising countermeasures because this delay means
returning to normal voltage when entering enclave mode may
incur substantial overhead. Furthermore, when comparing the
repetitions, it becomes apparent that voltage scaling behaves
non-deterministically, i.e., the actual voltage drop occurs at
different times after writing to MSR 0x150. However, from
an attacker’s perspective, our micro-benchmark also shows that
it is possible to precisely delay entry into a victim enclave
by continuously measuring current operating voltage until the
desired threshold is reached.
E. Tested Processors
For our experiments, we used different SGX-enabled pro-
cessors from Skylake onwards, cf. Table I. We also had access
to multiple CPUs with the same model numbers in some
cases. Because we found that different chips with the same
model number can behave differently when undervolted (cf.
Section III-A), we list those separately and refer to them with
a letter appended to the model number, e.g., i3-7100U-A, i3-
7100U-B, etc. We carried out all experiments using Ubuntu
16.04 or 18.04 with stock Linux v4.15 and v4.18 kernels.
We attempted to undervolt a Xeon processor (Broadwell-EP
E5-1630V4), however, found that in this case the MSR 0x150
does not seem to affect the core voltage.
TABLE I
PROCESSORS USED FOR THE EXPERIMENTS IN THIS PAPER. WHEN
MULTIPLE CPUS WITH THE SAME MODEL NUMBER WERE TESTED, WE
APPEND UPPERCASE LETTERS (-A, -B ETC).
Code name Model no. Microcode Frequency Vulnerable SGX
Broadwell E5-1630V4 0xb000036 N/A 7 7
Skylake i7-6700K 0xcc 2 GHz 3 3
Kaby Lake i7-7700HQ 0x48 2.0 GHz 3 3
i3-7100U-A 0xb4 1.0 GHz 3 3
i3-7100U-B 0xb4 2.0 GHz 3 3
i3-7100U-C 0xb4 2.0 GHz 3 3
Kaby Lake-R i7-8650U-A 0xb4 1.9 GHz 3 3
i7-8650U-B 0xb4 1.9 GHz 3 3
i7-8550U 0x96 2.6 GHz 3 3
Coffee Lake-R i9-9900U 0xa0 3.6 GHz 3 3
F. Implications for Older Processors
We verified that software-controlled undervolting is possible
on older CPUs, e.g., on the Haswell i5-4590, Haswell i7-4790
and the Core 2 Duo T9550. In fact, it has been possible
for system software to undervolt the processor from the
first generation of Intel Core processors [51]. However, to
the best of our understanding, this has no direct impact on
security because SGX is not available and the attacker requires
root permissions to write to the MSRs. The attack might
nevertheless be relevant in a hypervisor or cloud setting, where
an untrusted virtual machine can undervolt the CPU just before
a hypercall and/or context switch to another VM. This attack
scenario would require the hypervisor to be configured to allow
the untrusted virtual machine to directly access undocumented
MSRs (e.g., 0x150) and we did not find this in any real-world
configurations. Consequently, for the lack of plausible attack
targets, we did not extensively study the possibility of fault
induction on these processors. Our initial undervolting testing
yielded a voltage-dependent segmentation fault on the Haswell
i5-4590 and Haswell i7-4790 for the simple test program
described in Section III.
III. FAULTING IN-ENCLAVE MULTIPLICATIONS
As a first step towards practical fault injection into SGX
enclaves, we analyzed a number of x86 assembly instructions
in isolation. While we could not fault simple arithmetic (like
addition and subtraction) or bit-wise instructions (like shifts
and OR/XOR/AND), we found that multiplications can be
faulted. This might be explained by the fact that, on the
one hand, multipliers typically have a longer critical path
compared to adders or other simple operations, and, on the
other hand, that multiplications are likely to be most ag-
gressively optimized due to their prevalence in real-world
code. This conjecture is supported by the fact that we also
observed faults for other instructions with presumably complex
circuitry behind them, in particular the AES-NI extensions (cf.
Section IV-C).
Consider the following proof-of-concept implementation,
which runs a simple multiplication (the given code compiles to
assembly with imul instructions) in a loop inside an ECALL
handler:
uint64_t multiplier = 0x1122334455667788;
uint64_t var = 0xdeadbeef * multiplier;





var ˆ= 0xdeadbeef * multiplier;
Clearly, this program should not terminate. However, our
experiments show that undervolting the CPU just before
switching to the enclave leads to a bit-flip in var, typically
in byte 3 (counting from the least-significant byte as byte 0).
This allows the enclave program to terminate. The output is
the XOR with the desired value, to highlight only the faulty
bit(s). We observe that in this specific configuration the output
is always 0x04000000.
A. Analysis of Undervolting Effects on Multiplications
Using MSR 0x198 (IA32_PERF_STATUS), we were able
to read the voltage in normal operating mode and also record
the voltage when a faulty result was computed. While we
are aware that the measurements in this register might not be
precise in absolute terms, they reflect the relative undervolting
precisely. Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the measured relation
between frequency, normal voltage (blue), and the necessary
undervolting to trigger a faulty multiplication inside an SGX
enclave (orange) for the i3-7100U-A and an i7-8650U-A,
respectively.
Fig. 3. Base voltage (blue) and voltage for first fault (orange) vs. CPU
frequency for the i3-7100U-A
We conducted further investigations from normal (non-
SGX) code, as we found that these faults were identical to
those inside the SGX enclave. We wrote the following code
to enable the first operand (start_value) and the second
operand (multiplier) to be tested:
Fig. 4. Base voltage (blue) and voltage for first fault (orange) vs. CPU
frequency for the i7-8650U-A
/* drop voltage */
do {
i++;
var = start_value * multiplier;
} while (var == correct && i < iterations);
/* return voltage */
We then performed a search over different values for both
operands. The faulty results (see Table II for selected exam-
ples) generally fell into the following categories:
• One to five (contiguous) bits flip, or
• all most-significant bits flip.
Additionally, we also rarely observed faulty states in be-
tween, cf. the last entry in Table II and the fault used in
Section V-A. From those results, we noted:
• The smallest first operand to fault was 0x89af;
• the smallest second operand to fault was 0x1;
• the smallest faulted product was 0x80000*0x4, result-
ing in 0x200000; and
• the order of the operands is important when attempting
to produce a fault: For example, 0x4 * 0x80000 never
faulted in our experiments.
TABLE II
EXAMPLES OF FAULTED MULTIPLICATIONS ON I3-7100U-B AT 2 GHZ
Start value Multiplier Faulty result Flipped bits
0x080004 0x0008 0xfffffffff0400020 0xfffffffff0000000
0xa7fccc 0x0335 0x000000020abdba3c 0x0000000010000000
0x9fff4f 0x00b2 0x000000004f3f84ee 0x0000000020000000
0xacff13 0x00ee 0x000000009ed523aa 0x000000003e000000
0x2bffc0 0x0008 0x00000000005ffe00 0x0000000001000000
0x2bffc0 0x0008 0xfffffffff15ffe00 0xfffffffff0000000
0x2bffc0 0x0008 0x00000100115ffe00 0x0000010010000000
We also investigated the iterations and undervolting required
to produce faults (cf. Table III) on the i3-7100U-B at 2 GHz.
A higher number of iterations will fault with less undervolting,
i.e., the probability of a fault is lower with less undervolting.
For a small number of iterations, it is very difficult to induce
a fault, as the undervolting required caused the CPU to freeze
before a fault was observed. For the experiments in Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4, we used a large number of 100,000,000 iterations, so
faults occur with relatively low undervolting already.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF ITERATIONS UNTIL A FAULT OCCURS FOR THE
MULTIPLICATION (0XAE0000 * 0X18) VS. NECESSARY







100,000 crash at -161mV
B. Differences between CPUs with Same Model Number and
Temperature Dependencies
Another interesting observation is that the amount of under-
volting can differ between CPUs with the same model number.
We observed that the i3-7100U in an Intel NUC7i3BNH: i3-
7100U-A had a base voltage of 0.78 V at 1 GHz, and we
observed the first fault at 0.68 V (over 100 000 000 iterations).
In contrast, two other (presumably slightly newer) CPUs i3-
7100U-B and i3-7100U-C had a base voltage of approximately
0.69 V at the same frequency and began to fault at 0.6 V.
However, the processor with the higher base voltage toler-
ated more undervolting overall: the system was stable under-
volting up to approximately -250 mV, while the other CPUs
crashed at around -160 mV. This indicates that for certain
CPUs, a higher base voltage is configured (potentially in the
factory based on internal testing).
Finally, we observed that the required undervolting to reach
a faulty state depends (as expected) on the CPU tempera-
ture. For example, while the i3-7100U-A reliably faulted at
approximately -250 mV with a CPU temperature of 47◦ C, an
undervolting of -270 mV was required to obtain the same fault
at 39◦ C. While we have not investigated this behaviour in
detail, we note that the temperature dependency and possible
differences in “stability” of the fault warrant further investiga-
tion. All our attacks were performed at room temperature and
caused no impediments.
C. Overvolting
The VID interface specification limits the maximum voltage
to 1.52 V. According to the CPU datasheets [33], this voltage
is within the normal operating region. We experimentally
confirmed that we could not increase the voltage beyond
1.516 V (even with a higher value in the MSR), and we did not
observe any faults at 1.516 V at any frequency on i3-7100U-A.
IV. FROM FAULTS TO ENCLAVE KEY EXTRACTION
Having demonstrated the feasibility of fault injection into
SGX enclaves in Section III, we apply the undervolting tech-
niques to cryptographic libraries used in real-world enclaves.
To this end, we showcase practical fault attacks on mini-
malist benchmark enclaves using off-the-shelf cryptographic
libraries.
A. Corrupting OpenSSL Signatures
We first developed a simple proof-of-concept application
using OpenSSL in userspace. This application runs the mul-
tiplication loop from Section III until the first fault occurs
(to make sure the system is in a semi-stable state) and then
invokes OpenSSL as follows:
system("openssl dgst -sha256 -sign
private.pem test.c | openssl base64
>> log.txt");
Running at the standard voltage, this proof-of-concept out-
puts a constant signature. Running with undervolting (on the
i3-7100U-A at 1 GHz, -230 mV was sufficient), this generated
incorrect, apparently randomly changing signatures. While we
have not exploited this fault to factor the RSA key, this
motivating example shows that undervolting can successfully
inject faults into complex cryptographic computations, without
affecting overall system stability.
B. Full Key Extraction from RSA-CRT Decryption/Signature
in SGX using IPP Crypto
The tcrypto API of the Intel SGX-SDK only exposes
a limited number of cryptographic primitives. However, the
developer can also directly call IPP Crypto functions when
additional functionality is needed. One function that is avail-
able through this API is decryption or signature generation
using RSA with the frequently used Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) optimization. In the terminology of IPP
Crypto, this is referred to as “type 2” keys initialized through
ippsRSA_InitPrivateKeyType2(). We developed a proof-
of-concept enclave based on Intel example code [34].
Given an RSA public key (n, e) and the corresponding
private key (d, p q), RSA-CRT can speedup the computation
of y = xd (mod n) by a factor of around four. Internally,
RSA-CRT makes use of two sub-exponentiations, which are
recombined as:
y = [q · cp] · xdpp + [p · cq] · xdqq (mod n)
where dp = d (mod p− 1), dq = d (mod q − 1), xp =
x (mod p), xq = x (mod q), and cp, cq are pre-computed
constants.
RSA-CRT private key operations (decryption and signature)
are well-known to be vulnerable to the Bellcore and Lenstra
fault-injection attacks [9], which simply require a fault in
exactly one of the two exponentiations of the core RSA
operation without further requirements to the nature or location
of the fault. Assuming that a fault only affects one of the two
sub-exponentiations xdpp (mod p) and given the respective
faulty output y′, one can factor the modulus n using the
Bellcore attack as:
q = gcd (y − y′, n) , p = n/q
The Lenstra method removes the necessity to obtain both




e − y, n
)
instead.
As a first step to practically demonstrate this attack for SGX,
we successfully injected faults into the ippsRSA_Decrypt()
function running within an SGX enclave on the i3-7100U-A,
undervolting by -225 mV for the whole duration of the RSA
operation. However, this resulted in non-exploitable faults,
presumably since both sub-exponentiations had been faulted.
We therefore introduced a second thread (in the untrusted
code) that resets the voltage to a stable value after one third
of the overall duration of the targeted ECALL. With this
approach, the obtained faults could be used to factor the 2048-
bit RSA modulus using the Lenstra and Bellcore attacks, and
hence to recover the full key with a single faulty decryption or
signature and negligible computational effort. An example for
faulty RSA-CRT inputs and outputs is given in Appendix B.
C. Differential Fault Analysis of AES-NI in SGX
Having demonstrated the feasibility of enclave key-
extraction attacks for RSA-CRT, we turn our attention to
Intel AES New Instructions (AES-NI). This set of processor
instructions provide very efficient hardware implementations
for AES key schedule and round computation. For instance,
on the Skylake architecture, an AES round instruction has
a latency of only four clock cycles and a throughput of
one cycle per instruction1. AES-NI is widely used in cryp-
tographic libraries, including SGX’s tcrypto API, which
exposes functions for AES in Galois Counter Mode (GCM),
normal counter mode, and in the CMAC construction. These
crypto primitives are then used throughout the Intel SGX-
SDK, including crucial operations like sealing and unsealing
of enclave data. Other SGX crypto libraries (e.g., mbedtls
in Microsoft OpenEnclave) also make use of the AES-NI
instructions.
Our experiments show that the AES-NI encryption round
instruction (v)aesenc is vulnerable to Plundervolt attacks:
we observed faults on the i7-8650U-A with -195 mV under-
volting and on the i3-7100U-A with -232 mV undervolting.
The faults were always a single bit-flip on the leftmost
two bytes of the round function’s output. Such single bit-flip
faults are ideally suited for Differential Fault Analysis (DFA).
Examples of correct and faulty output are:
[Enclave] plaintext: 697DBA24B0885D4E120FFCAB82DDEC25




[Enclave] round key: BE7ED6DB9171EBBF9EA51569425D6DDE
[Enclave] ciphertext1: 0D42753C23026D11884385F373EAC66C
[Enclave] ciphertext2: 0D40753C23026D11884385F373EAC66C
Next, we use these single-round faults to build an enclave
key-recovery attack against the full AES. We took a canonical
AES implementation using AES-NI instructions2 and ran it
1https://software.intel.com/sites/landingpage/IntrinsicsGuide/#expand=
233&text= mm aesenc si128
2https://gist.github.com/acapola/d5b940da024080dfaf5f
in an enclave with undervolting as before. Unsurprisingly, the
probability of a fault hitting a particular round instruction is
approx. 1/10, which suggests a uniform distribution over each of
the ten AES rounds. By repeating the operation often enough
(5 times on average) we get a fault in round 8. An example
output for this (using the key 0x000102030405060708090a
0b0c0d0e0f) is the following:
[Enclave] plaintext: 5ABB97CCFE5081A4598A90E1CEF1BC39
[Enclave] CT1: DE49E9284A625F72DB87B4A559E814C4 <- faulty
[Enclave] CT2: BDFADCE3333976AD53BB1D718DFC4D5A <- correct
input to round 10:
[Enclave] 1: CD58F457 A9F61565 2880132E 14C32401
[Enclave] 2: AEEBC19C D0AD3CBA A0BCBAFA C0D77D9F
input to round 9:
[Enclave] 1: 6F6356F9 26F8071F 9D90C6B2 E6884534
[Enclave] 2: 6F6356C7 26F8D01F 9DF7C6B2 A4884534
input to round 8:
[Enclave] 1: 1C274B5B 2DFD8544 1D8AEAC0 643E70A1
[Enclave] 2: 1C274B5B 2DFD8544 1D8AEAC0 646670A1
In order to understand the fault (the following profiling is
not part of the actual attack and only needs to be done once),
we took both correct and faulty ciphertexts and decrypted them
round-by-round while comparing the intermediate states. The
result can be seen in the above output: Observe that byte one
(counting from the left in the rightmost word) in round 8
has changed from 0x66 to 0x3E. This faulty byte is actually
caused by an XOR with 0x02 (i.e., a single-bit flip) for state
byte one after SubBytes in round 8. We established this by
simulating the AES invocation and trying different fault masks.
Equipped with this fault in round 8, we were able to apply the
differential fault analysis technique by Tunstall et al. [68] as
implemented by Jovanovic3:
Given a pair of correct and faulty ciphertext on the same
plaintext, this attack is able to recover the full 128-bit AES key
with a computational complexity of only 232+256 encryptions
on average. We have run this attack in practice and it only
took a couple of minutes to extract the full AES key from the
enclave, including both fault injection and key computation
phases. The steps to reproduce this attack with the above pair
of correct and faulty ciphertexts are given in Appendix D.
D. Faulting Intel SGX’s Key Derivation Primitives
Finally, we investigated whether we can successfully apply
our undervolting techniques to inject faults in Intel SGX’s
hardware-level key derivation instructions. These primitives
form the basis for local and remote attestation, as well as
sealing, and are indispensable to bootstrap trust in the SGX
ecosystem [1]. As with most of SGX’s trusted computing
base, complex key derivation functionality is implemented
in microcode [14] and, according to an Intel patent [47],
may leverage the processor’s native AES-NI instructions to
accelerate some of the cryptographic operations. Hence, our
hypothesis is that we can produce incorrect key derivations
through an Plundervolt attack. While this in itself does not
directly break SGX’s security objectives (the attestation will
3https://github.com/Daeinar/dfa-aes
simply fail), faulty key derivations may, in turn, reveal in-
formation about the processor’s long-term key material that
should never be exposed to software. In this section, we
merely want to show that even complex microcode instructions
can be successfully faulted. We leave further exploration and
cryptanalysis of such faults as future work.
a) Faulting EGETKEY: Enclaves can make use of SGX’s
key derivation facility by means of a dedicated EGETKEY
instruction [1, 14]. This instruction derives an enclave-specific
128-bit symmetric key based on a hardware-level master
secret, which is burned into efuses during the processor manu-
facturing process and never directly exposed to software. The
exact key derivation algorithm implemented in the microcode
is largely undocumented, but one Intel patent [47] reveals that
AES-CMAC is used with a derivative string specifying, among
others, a software-provided KeyID and the calling enclave’s
identity. We furthermore confirmed that Intel’s official SGX
software simulator4 indeed relies on AES-CMAC with a fixed
128-bit secret for key derivations.
Our experimental setup consists of a minimal attacker-
controlled enclave that first prepares a fixed key request and
thereafter repeatedly derives the expected cryptographic key
using the EGETKEY assembly instruction. We expect the de-
rived key to be constant, since we made sure to always supply
the exact same KeyID meta data. However, our experiments
on the i3-7100U-C running at 2 GHz with -134 mV under-
volting showed that Plundervolt can reliably fault such SGX
key derivations. We provide several samples of incorrectly
derived keys in Appendix E. Interestingly, we noticed that
key derivation faults appear to be largely deterministic. That
is, for a fixed KeyID, the same (wrong) key seems to be
produced most of the time when undervolting, even across
reboots. However, we also observed, at least once, that two
different faulty keys can be produced for the same KeyID, cf.
Appendix E.
b) Faulting EREPORT: SGX supports local attestation
through the EREPORT primitive. This instruction can be in-
voked by a client enclave to create a tagged measurement
report destined for another target enclave residing on the same
platform. For this, EREPORT first performs an internal key
derivation to establish a secret key that can only be derived by
the intended target enclave executing on the same processor.
This key is thereafter used in the EREPORT microcode to create
a 128-bit AES-CMAC that authenticates the report data. We
experimentally confirmed that Plundervolt can indeed reliably
induce faults in local attestation report MACs. We provide a
few samples of faulty report MACs in Appendix F. As with the
EGETKEY experiments above, we noticed that the faulty MACs
appear to be deterministic. However, faulty MACs do change
across reboots as EREPORT generates an internal random Key
ID on every processor cycle.
E. Faulting Other Intel IPP Crypto Primitives in SGX
In addition to the above key extractions from RSA-CRT and
AES-NI, we applied the undervolting technique to a number of
4https://github.com/intel/linux-sgx/blob/master/sdk/simulation/tinst/deriv.cpp#L90
enclaves using other tcrypto APIs. We successfully injected
faults into the following primitives among others:
AES-GCM In certain cases, faults in sgx_rijndael128GCM
_encrypt() only affect the MAC, aside from our results
on AES-NI in Section IV-C. Note that DFA is not directly
applicable to AES in GCM mode, since it is not possible
(if used correctly) to get two encryptions with the same
nonce and plaintext.
Elliptic Curves We also observed faults in elliptic curve
signatures (sgx_ecdsa_sign()) and key exchange
(sgx_ecc256_compute_shared_dhkey()).
This list of cryptographic fault targets is certainly not ex-
haustive. We leave the examination of fault targets for Plunder-
volt, as well as the evaluation of their practical exploitability
for future work, which requires pinpointing the fault location
and debugging IPP crypto implementations. There is a large
body of work regarding the use of faults for key recovery
that could be applicable once the effect of the fault for each
implementation has been precisely understood. Fan et al. [17]
provide an overview of fault attacks against elliptic curves,
while other researchers [18, 15] discuss faults in nonce-based
encryption modes like AES-GCM.
V. MEMORY SAFETY VIOLATIONS DUE TO FAULTS
In addition to the extraction of cryptographic keys, we show
that Plundervolt can also cause memory safety misbehavior in
certain situations. The key idea is to abuse the fact that com-
pilers often rely on correct multiplication results for pointer
arithmetic and memory allocation sizes. One example for this
would be indexing into an array a of type elem_t: according
to the C standard, accessing element a[i] requires calculating
the address at offset i*sizeof(elem_t). Clearly, out-of-
bounds accesses arise if an attacker can fault such multipli-
cations to produce address offsets that are larger or smaller
than the architecturally defined result (cf. Section III). Note
that Plundervolt ultimately breaks the processor’s ISA-level
guarantees, i.e., we assume perfectly secure code that has
been guarded against both traditional buffer overflows [16] as
well as state-of-the-art Spectre-style [42] transient execution
attacks.
In this section, we explore two distinct scenarios where
faulty multiplications impair memory safety guarantees in
seemingly secure code. First, we fault imul instructions
transparently emitted by the compiler to reliably produce
out-of-bounds array accesses. Next, we analyze trusted SGX
runtime libraries and locate several sensitive multiplications in
allocation size computations that could lead to heap corruption
by allocating insufficient memory.
A. Faulting Array Index Addresses
We first focus on the case where a multiplication is used
for computing the effective memory address of an array
element as follows: &a[i]=&a[0]+i*sizeof(elem_t).
However, we found that, in most cases, when the respective
type has a size that is a power of two, compilers will use left
bitshifts instead of explicit imul instructions. Furthermore,
as concluded from the micro-benchmark analysis presented
in Section III, we found it difficult (though not impossible) to
consistently produce multiplication faults where both operands
are ≤ 0xFFFF without crashing the CPU (cf. Section V-B).
Hence, here we only consider cases in this section where si
zeof(elem_t) 6= 2x and i > 216.
a) Launch Enclave Application Scenario: To illustrate
that our attack requirements can be realistically met and
exploited in compiler-generated enclave code, we constructed
an example enclave application. Our application scenario takes
advantage of the “flexible launch control” [39] features in
the latest SGX processors via a custom Launch Enclave that
decides which other enclaves are allowed to be loaded on the
platform. We loosely based our implementation on the open-
source reference launch enclave code (psw/ae/ref_le) pro-
vided by Intel as part of its SGX SDK [35]. For completeness,
we refer to Appendix G for full source code and disassembly
of the relevant functions.
Our custom Launch Enclave maintains a global fixed-length
array of white-listed enclave authors. Each element in this
array is a composite struct data type specifying the white-
listed enclave author’s MRSIGNER hash, plus whether or not
her enclaves are allowed access to the special platform “pro-
visioning key”. The latter restriction relates to CPU tracking
privacy concerns [14]. Specifically, the provisioning key is
the only SGX key which is directly derived from a long-term
platform-specific cryptographic secret, without first including
an internal OWNEREPOCH register. Hence, the provisioning
key remains constant as a processor changes owners, and is
normally only available to privileged architectural enclaves
that establish long-term platform attestation key material.
The security objective of our example scenario is to en-
force a simple launch control policy: only enclave authors
whose MRSIGNER value is present in the global white list
are allowed to run production enclaves on the system (poten-
tially with an additional restriction on the provisioning key
attribute). For this, our sample Launch Enclave repeatedly
calls a check_wl_entry() function in a for loop to look
up and compare to every element in the global white list
array. Note that our sample Launch Enclave merely returns a
non-zero value if access is allowed, as we omitted the actual
computation of the cryptographic launch token for simplicity.
Evidently, after the global white list has been initialized to
all zeroes, our Launch Enclave should never return 1 when
looking up the adversary’s non-zero MRSIGNER value.
b) Launch Enclave Exploitation: Figure 5 visualizes the
high-level attack flow in our application scenario. For exploita-
tion, we first turn our attention to the check_wl_entry()
function 1 which indexes into the global white list array.
As evident from Appendix G, this array access compiles
to an imul$0x21,%rdi,%rdi instruction, which calculates
the required offset to be added to the array base address
afterwards. In order to reliably fault 2 this product, the array
index specified in the %rdi parameter needs to be sufficiently
large (cf. Section III). Specifically, we experimentally estab-


















Fig. 5. Example scenario of a custom launch enclave where erroneous
multiplication bitflips allow to redirect a trusted white list array lookup to
attacker-controlled memory outside the enclave.
reliably induce predictable faults in the multiplication result
(the victim Launch Enclave almost always hits an exploitable
fault in under 100 invocations). We noticed that Plundervolt
frequently causes the higher-order bits to be flipped in the
faulty product. For example, 0x80D36 * 0x21 = 0x109b3f6
predictably faults to 0xffffffffe109b417 at 2 GHz and
undervolting of -118 mV on the i3-7100U-C. Notice that flip-
ping the most-significant bits effectively causes the resulting
product to be interpreted as a large negative offset (in the order
of magnitude of the computed number) relative to the trusted
array base address. Hence, after adding the faulty product,
the resulting address now points in the large untrusted 48-bit
address space outside the enclave.
In the next stage of the attack, the victim enclave unknow-
ingly dereferences the erroneous white list element pointer
as if it was in-enclave memory. Since the virtual memory
region before the enclave base has not been allocated, this
access causes a page fault 3 to be delivered to the un-
trusted operating system. We installed a custom signal handler
4 which subsequently mmap()s the required memory page
on demand. At this point, the adversary can setup a bogus
white list entry with her own MRSIGNER hash and provision-
ing key attribute in attacker-controlled memory outside the
enclave. Note, however, that SGX clears the least significant
12 bits in the reported page fault address to limit page fault
side-channel exposure [78]. Hence, for a successful attack,
we should still determine at which offset within the allocated
page to place the bogus MRSIGNER value. To overcome this
challenge, we observe that the multiplication bit-flips induced
by Plundervolt are often very deterministic and predictable.
That is, we noticed that frequently the exact same bits are
flipped by applying a constant XOR mask to the expected
product (e.g., 0xffffffffe00007e1 in the above example).
We thus conveniently pre-compute the expected fault mask by
running identical code in our own debug enclave, so that we
can afterwards accurately predict the page offset of the faulty
address by XORing the precomputed mask with the correct
product. As a final challenge for this to work, we still require
knowledge of the correct product, i.e., the architecturally
expected array offset depending on the current loop iteration
in the enclave. However, this is actually a standard scenario in
classical side-channel attack works, which accurately recon-
struct enclave control flow by, for instance, monitoring page
table access patterns [78, 73], cache accesses [58] or interrupt
counts [71, 72]. To improve reproducibility, we disclose the
current loop iteration in our current proof-of-concept attack
code (Appendix G) providing the same information without
noise.
Finally, after the bogus white list entry has been constructed
in untrusted memory, the adversary merely resumes 5 the
victim enclave. The latter will now proceed and unknowingly
dereferences 6 the attacker-controlled memory page instead
of the trusted white list entry in enclave memory. The attack
is successfully concluded when the benign Launch Enclave
eventually returns one after the adversary’s MRSIGNER and
provisioning key values were successfully matched.
B. Faulting Memory Allocation Sizes
Apart from array indices, we identified size computations
for dynamic memory allocations as another common program-
ming pattern that relies on correct multiplication results. We
showed in Section III that imul can also be faulted to produce
results that are smaller than the correct value. Clearly, heap
corruption may arise when such a faulty multiplication result
is used to allocate a contiguous chunk of heap memory that
is smaller than the expected size. Since Plundervolt corrupts
multiplications silently, i.e., without failing the respective
malloc() library call, the client code has no means of
determining the actual size of the allocated buffer and will
subsequently read or write out-of-bounds.
a) edger8r-generated Code: To ease secure enclave
development, the official Intel SGX-SDK comes with a dedi-
cated edger8r tool that generates trusted proxy bridge code to
transparently copy user arguments to and from enclave private
heap memory [35, 70]. The tool automatically generates C
code based on the ECALL function’s prototype and explicit
programmer annotations that specify pointer directions and
sizes. Consider the following (simplified) example enclave
code, where the [in,count] attributes are used to specify
that arr is an input array with cnt elements:
void vuln_ecall([in, count=cnt] struct_foo_t *arr,
size_t cnt, size_t offset)
{
if (offset >= cnt) return;
arr[offset].foo1 = 0xdeadbeef;
}
The edger8r tool will generate the following (simplified)
trusted wrapper code for parameter checking and marshalling:
...
size_t _tmp_cnt = ms->ms_cnt;





The above code first computes the expected size _len
_arr of the input array, allocates sufficient space on the
enclave heap, and finally copies the input array into the
enclave before invoking the programmer’s vuln_ecall()
function. Crucially, if a multiplication fault occurs during
calculation of the _len_arr variable, a potentially smaller
buffer will be allocated and passed on to the actual ECALL
function. Any subsequent writes or reads to the allocated buffer
may cause inadvertent enclave heap corruption or disclosure.
For example, the above vuln_ecall() implementation is
safeguarded against overflows in a classical sense, but can
trigger a heap overflow when the above multiplication is
faulted and arr is smaller than expected.
For the type used in this example, we have
sizeof(struct_foo_t)=0x64. We performed initial
testing based on our micro-benchmark from Section III,
established a predictable fault for this parameter, and verified
that the enclave indeed corrupts trusted heap memory when
computing on a buffer with the faulty size. Specifically, we
found that the multiplication 0x08b864 * 0x64 = 0x36807
10 reliably faults to a smaller result 0x1680710 with an
undervolting of -250 mV on our i3-7100U-A system.
For convenience during exploit development, we artificially
injected the same fault at compile time by changing the
generated edger8r code from the Makefile.
b) calloc() in SGX Runtime Libraries: Another pos-
sible target for fault injection is the hidden multiplication
involved in calls to the prevalent calloc() function in the
standard C library. This function is commonly used to allocate
memory for an array where the number of elements and the
size of each element are provided as separate arguments.
According to the calloc() specification, the resulting buffer
will have a total size equal to the product of both arguments
if the allocation succeeds. Note that optimizations of power-
of-two sizes to shifts are not applicable in this case, since the
multiplication happens with generic function parameters.
Consider the following calloc() implementation from
musl-libc, an integral part of the SGX-LKL [54] library
OS for running unmodified C applications inside enclaves5:
void *calloc(size_t m, size_t n)
{





void *p = malloc(n);
...
}
In this case, if the product n*=m can be faulted to produce
a smaller result, subsequent code may trigger a heap overflow,
eventually leading to memory leakage, corruption, or possibly
even control flow redirection when neighbouring heap chunks
contain function pointers e.g., in a vtable. Based on practical
experiments with the i3-7100U-A, we artificially injected a
realistic fault for the product 0x2bffc0 * 0x8 = 0x15ffe00
5https://github.com/lsds/sgx-lkl-musl/blob/db8c09/src/malloc/malloc.c#L352
via code rewriting in SGX-LKL’s musl-libc to cause an
insufficient allocation of 0x5ffe00 bytes and a subsequent
heap overflow in a test enclave.
We also investigated calloc() implementations in Intel’s
SGX SDK [35] and Microsoft’s OpenEnclave [48], but inter-
estingly found that their implementations are hardened against
(traditional) integer overflows as follows:
if (n_elements != 0) {
req = n_elements * elem_size;
if (((n_elements | elem_size) & ˜(size_t)0xffff)
&& (req / n_elements != elem_size))
req = MAX_SIZE_T; /* force downstream failure on
overflow */
}
Note how the above code triggers a division (that would
detect the faulty product) if at least one of n_elements and
elem_size is larger than 0xFFFF. Producing faults where
both operands are ≤ 0xFFFF (cf. Section III) is possible, e.g.,
we got a fault for 0x97b5*0x40 on the i3-7100U-A. How-
ever, in the majority of attempts, this leads to a crash because
the CPU has to be undervolted to the point of becoming
unstable. The above check (without the restriction on only
being active for at least operand being > 0xFFFF) serves as
an example of possible software hardening countermeasures,
as discussed in Section VII.
VI. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Compared to widely studied fault injection attacks in cryp-
tographic algorithms, memory safety implications of faulty
instruction results have received comparatively little attention.
In the context of physically injected faults, Govindavajhala
et al. [20] demonstrated how a single-bit memory error can
be exploited to achieve code execution in the Java/.NET
VM, using a lightbulb to overheat the memory chip. Barbu
et al. [5] used laser fault injection to bypass a type check
on a Javacard and load a malicious applet afterwards. In the
context of software-based Rowhammer attacks, on the other
hand, Seaborn and Dullien [60] showed how to flip operand
bits in x86 instruction streams to escape a Native Client
sandbox, and more recently Gruss et al. [21] flipped opcode
bits to bypass authentication checks in a privileged victim
binary. While flipping bits in instruction opcodes enables the
application control flow to be illegally redirected, none of these
approaches directly produce incorrect computation results.
Furthermore, Rowhammer attacks originate outside the CPU
package and are hence fully mitigated through SGX’s memory
integrity protection [24], which reliably halts the system if an
integrity check fails [21, 38].
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore
the memory safety implications of faulty multiplications in
compiler-generated code. Compared to prior work [65] that
demonstrated frequency scaling fault injection attacks against
ARM TrustZone cryptographic implementations, we show that
undervolting is not exclusively a concern for cryptographic
algorithms. As explored in the following Section VII, this
observation has profound consequences for reasoning about
secure enclave code, i.e., merely relying on fault-resistant
cryptographic primitives is insufficient to protect against Plun-
dervolt adversaries at the software level.
While there is a long line of work on dismantling SGX’s
confidentiality guarantees [69, 11, 46, 73, 50, 25, 72] as
well as exploiting classical memory safety vulnerabilities in
enclaves [45, 8, 70], Plundervolt represents the first attack
that directly violates SGX’s integrity guarantees for func-
tionally correct enclave software. By directly breaking ISA-
level processor semantics, Plundervolt ultimately undermines
even relaxed “transparent enclaved execution” paradigms [66]
that solely require integrity of enclave computations while
assuming unbounded side-channel leakage.
The differences and ramifications of violating integrity
vs. confidentiality guarantees for enclaved computations can
often be rather subtle. For instance, the authors of the Fore-
shadow [69] attack extracted enclave private sealing keys
(confidentiality breach), which subsequently allowed an active
man-in-the-middle position to be established - enabling all
traffic to be read and modified from an enclave (integrity
breach). Likewise, we showed that faulty multiplications or
encryptions can lead to unintended disclosure of enclave se-
crets. Our Launch Enclave application scenario of Section V-A
is another instance of the tension between confidentiality
and integrity. That is, the aforementioned Foreshadow attack
showed how to bypass enclave launch control by extracting
the platform’s “launch key” needed to authenticate launch
tokens, whereas our attack intervened much more directly
with the integrity of the enclaved execution by faulting pointer
arithmetics and redirecting the trusted white list into attacker-
controlled memory.
VII. COUNTERMEASURES
In Intel SGX’s threat model, the operating system is con-
sidered untrusted. However, we showed that while an enclave
is running, privileged adversaries can manipulate MSR 0x150
and reliably fault in-enclave computations. Hence, counter-
measures cannot be implemented at the level of the untrusted
OS or in the untrusted runtime components. Instead, two
possible approaches to mitigating Plundervolt are possible:
preventing unsafe undervolting directly at the level of the CPU
hardware and microcode, or hardening the trusted in-enclave
code itself against faults. Respective methods can be used
separately or—to increase the level of protection—in com-
bination, as is common practice for high-security embedded
devices like smartcards.
In the following, we first overview potential approaches
to mitigate Plundervolt attacks at the hardware and software
levels. Next, we conclude this section by summarizing the
specific mitigation strategy adopted by Intel.
A. Hardware-Level and Microcode-Level Countermeasures
a) Disabling MSR Interface: Given the impact of our
findings, we recommend initiating SGX trusted computing
base recovery by applying microcode updates that completely
disable the software voltage scaling interface exposed via MSR
0x150. However, given the apparent complexity of dynamic
voltage and frequency scaling functionality in modern Intel
x86 processors, we are concerned that this proposed solution
is still rather ad-hoc and does not cover the root cause for Plun-
dervolt. That is, other yet undiscovered vectors for software-
based fault injection through power and clock management
features might exist and would need to be disabled in a similar
manner.
Ultimately, even if all software-accessible interfaces have
been disabled, adversaries with physical access to the CPU are
also within Intel SGX’s threat model. Especially disturbing in
this respect is that the SerialVID bus between the CPU and
voltage regulator appear to be unauthenticated [30, 31]. Hence
adversaries might be able to physically connect to this bus and
overwrite the requested voltage directly at the hardware level.
Alternatively, advanced adversaries could even replace the
voltage regulator completely with a dedicated voltage glitcher
(although this may be technically non-trivial given the required
large currents).
b) Scaling Back Voltage during Enclave Operation:
Plundervolt relies on the property that CPU voltage changes
outside of enclave mode persist during enclave execution. A
straw man defense strategy could be to automatically scale
back any applied undervolting when the processor enters en-
clave mode. Interestingly, we noticed that Intel seems to have
already followed this path for its (considerably older) TXT
trusted computing extensions. In particular, the documentation
of the according SENTER instruction mentions that [36, 6-21]:
“Before loading and authentication of the target code module is
performed, the processor also checks that the current voltage and
bus ratio encodings correspond to known good values supportable by
the processor. [. . . ] the SENTER function will attempt to change the
voltage and bus ratio select controls in a processor-specific manner.”
However, we make the crucial observation that this defense
strategy does not suffice to fully safeguard Intel SGX enclaves.
That is, in contrast to Intel TXT which transfers control to a
measured trusted environment, SGX features a more dynamic
design where attacker code and trusted enclaves are interfaced
at runtime. Hence, while one core is in enclave mode, another
physical core could attempt to trigger the undervolting for
the shared voltage plane in parallel after entering the victim
enclave. Therefore, such checks would need to be continuously
enforced every time any core is in enclave mode. This defense
strategy is further complicated by the observation that the time
between a write to MSR 0x150 and the actual voltage change
manifesting is relatively large (order of magnitude of 500k
TSC cycles, cf. Fig. 2). Therefore, removing and restoring
undervolting on each enclave entry and exit would likely add
a substantial overhead.
c) Limiting to Known Good Values: Even slightly under-
volting the CPU creates significant power and heat reductions;
properties that are highly desirable in data centers, for mobile
computing and for other end user applications like gaming.
Completely removing this feature might incur substantial
limitations in practice. As an alternative solution, the exposed
software interface could be adjusted to limit the amount of
permitted undervolting to known “safe” values whitelisted
by the processor. However, this mitigation strategy is fur-
ther complicated by our observations that safe voltage levels
depend on the current operating frequency and temperature
and may even differ between CPUs of the same model (cf.
Section III-A). Hence, establishing such safe values would
require a substantial amount of additional per-chip testing at
each frequency. Even then, circuit-aging effects can affect safe
values as the processor gets older [40].
d) Multi-variant Enclave Execution: A perpendicular ap-
proach, instead of trying to prevent undervolting faults directly,
would be to modify processors to reliably detect faulty compu-
tation results. Such a defense may, for instance, leverage ideas
from multi-variant execution [28, 76, 43] software hardening
techniques. Specifically: processors could execute enclaved
computations twice in parallel on two different cores and halt
once the executions diverge. To limit the performance penalty
of such an approach, we propose leveraging commodity Hy-
perThreading [36] features in Intel CPUs and turn them from
a security concern into a security feature for fault resistancy.
After a long list of SGX attacks [69, 75, 59, 50] demonstrated
how enclave secrets can be reconstructed from a sibling CPU
core, Intel officially recommended disabling hyperthreading
when using SGX enclaves [32]. However, this also imposes a
significant performance impact on any non-SGX workloads.
A well known solution to fault injection attacks is re-
dundancy [4], either in hardware, by duplicating potentially
targeted circuits, or in software by duplicating potentially tar-
geted parts of the instruction stream, and frequently checking
for mismatches in both cases. For instance, Oh et al. [52]
and later Reis et al. [56] proposed duplicating the instruction
stream to produce software that is tolerant against hardware-
induced faults. In the case of SGX, such a solution might also
be applied at the microarchitectural level. The processor would
simply run the duplicated instructions in parallel on the two
hyperthreads of a core. Faults would be reliably detected if the
probability that the attacker induced the exact same fault in two
immediately subsequent executions of the same instructions is
significantly lower than the probability of observing a single
fault at some point in time.
B. Software-Level Hardening
a) Fault-Resistant Cryptographic Primitives: There is a
large body of work regarding fault injection countermeasures
for cryptographic algorithms, including (generic) temporal
and/or spatial redundancy [26] and algorithm-specific ap-
proaches such as performing the inverse operation or more
advanced techniques like ineffective computation [19].
For the example of RSA-CRT signature/decryption (cf.
Section IV-B), the result could be verified before outputting by
performing a (in the case of RSA with small public exponent)
cheap signature verification/encryption operation. Indeed, such
a check is present by default in some cryptographic libraries,
e.g., mbedtls. However, for the Intel SGX-SDK this might
require changes to the API specification of tcrypto, as the
public key is currently not supplied as a parameter to private
key operations.
For AES-NI (cf. Section IV-C), an encryption operation
could be followed by a decryption to verify that the plaintext
remains unchanged. However, this would incur substantial
performance overhead, doubling the runtime of an encryption.
Trade-offs like storing the intermediate state after k rounds
and then only performing 10 − k inverse rounds (for AES-
128) can defeat DFA but might still be susceptible to statistical
attacks [18].
b) Application and Compiler Hardening: It is important
to note that SGX supports general-purpose, non-cryptographic
code that can also be successfully exploited with Plundervolt,
as demonstrated in Section V. To further complicate matters,
typical enclave runtime libraries contain numerous, potentially
exploitable mul and imul instructions. For instance, we
found that the trusted runtime code for a minimalistic enclave
using the Intel SGX-SDK [35] contains 23 multiplications,
with many in standard library functions like free(). For
comparison, the trusted runtime part of Microsoft’s OpenEn-
clave SDK [48] contains 203 multiplications, while Graphene-
SGX’s [67] libpal-Linux-SGX.so features 71 mul/imul
instructions.
Certain standard library functions like calloc() could be
hardened manually by inserting checks for the correctness of a
multiplication, e.g., through a subsequent division, as already
implemented in the Intel SGX-SDK (see Section V-B). How-
ever, in functions where many “faultable” multiplications are
being used (e.g., public-key cryptography, signal processing,
or machine learning algorithms), this would incur significant
overhead. Furthermore, each case of a problematic instruction
needs to be analyzed separately, often at the assembly level
to understand the exact consequences of a successful fault
injection. Finally, it should be noted that while we have
focused on multiplications in our analysis, defenses should
also take into account the possibility of faulting other high-
latency instructions.
c) Traditional Memory Safety Hardening: As a final
consideration, we recommend applying more general counter-
measures known from traditional memory safety application
hardening [16] in an enclave setting. One approach to hinder
Plundervolt-induced memory safety exploitation would be to
randomize the enclave memory layout using systems like
SGX-Shield [61]. Yet, it is important to note that these tech-
niques can only raise the bar for actual exploitation, without
removing the actual root cause of the attack.
C. Intel’s Mitigation Plan
Following the responsible disclosure, Intel’s Product Secu-
rity Incident Response Team informed us of their mitigation
plans with the following statement:
“After carefully reviewing the CPU voltage setting modification, Intel
is mitigating the issue in two parts, a BIOS patch to disable the
overclocking mailbox interface configuration. Secondly, a microcode
update will be released that reflects the mailbox enablement status
as part of SGX TCB [Trusted Computing Base] attestation. The
Intel Attestation Service (IAS) and the Platform Certificate Retrieval
Service will be updated with new keys in due course. The IAS
users will receive a ‘CONFIGURATION NEEDED’ message from
platforms that do not disable the overclocking mailbox interface.”
We note that Intel’s strategy to disable MSR 0x150 (i.e.,
said “mailbox interface”) corresponds to our recommended
mitigation outlined in Section VII-A. However, this strategy
may not cover the root cause for Plundervolt. Other, yet
undiscovered, avenues for fault injection through power and
clock management features might exist (and would have to
be disabled in a similar manner). Finally, we want to stress
that, similiar to previous high-profile SGX attacks like Fore-
shadow [69], Intel’s mitigation plan for Plundervolt requires
trusted computing base recovery [1, 14]. That is, after the
microcode update, different sealing and attestation keys will be
derived depending on whether or not the undervolting interface
at MSR 0x150 has been disabled at boot time. This allows
remote verifiers to re-establish trust after resealing all existing
enclave secrets with the new key material.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have identified a new, powerful attack
surface of Intel SGX. We have shown how voltage scaling can
be reliably abused by privileged adversaries to corrupt both
integrity and confidentiality of SGX enclaved computations.
To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first practical
attack that directly breaches the integrity guarantees in the
Intel SGX security architecture. We have proven that this
attack vector is realistic and practical with full key recovery
PoC attacks against RSA-CRT and AES-NI. Furthermore, we
have provided evidence that other micro-instructions can be
faulted as well. Some of these instructions, like EGETKEY
and EREPORT, are the basic building blocks that underpin the
security of the whole SGX ecosystem.
We have shown that Plundervolt attacks are not limited to
cryptographic primitives, but also enable more subtle memory
safety violations. We have exploited multiplication faults in
fundamental programming constructs such as array indexing,
and shown their relevance for widespread memory allocation
functionality in Intel SGX-SDK edger8r-generated code and
in the SGX-LKL runtime. In conclusion, our work provides
further evidence that the enclaved execution promise of out-
sourcing sensitive computations to untrusted remote platforms
creates new and unexpected attack surfaces that continue to
be relevant and need to be studied further.
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APPENDIX A
SCRIPT FOR CONFIGURING CPU FREQUENCY
#!/bin/bash
if [ $# -ne 1 ] ; then
echo "Incorrect number of arguments" >&2
echo "Usage $0 <frequency>" >&2
echo "Example $0 1.6GHz" >&2
exit
fi
sudo cpupower -c all frequency-set -u $1
sudo cpupower -c all frequency-set -d $1
APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE FAULT FOR RSA-CRT




























Injecting a fault during the first half of the RSA-CRT
computation on the i3-7100U-A at 1 GHz with -225 mV un-









FURTHER EXAMPLES FOR AES-NI AESENC FAULTS
[Enclave] plaintext: 4C96DD4E44B4278E6F49FCFC8FCFF5C9




















RUNNING DFA AGAINST AES-NI
Based on the fault described in Section IV-C, the input file
fault.txt to the DFA implementation from https://github.
com/Daeinar/dfa-aes should contain the following line:
BDFADCE3333976AD53BB1D718DFC4D5A DE49E9284A625
F72DB87B4A559E814C4
This fault was obtained on the i7-8650U-A with -195 mV
undervolting at 1.9 GHz.
We ran the DFA implementation on four cores, knowing
that the fault is in byte one as follows:
./dfa 4 1 fault.txt
This yields 595 key candidates for this particular example,
including the correct secret key value 0x000102030405060
708090a0b0c0d0e0f.
APPENDIX E
EXAMPLES OF EGETKEY FAULTS
All samples in this appendix were collected on the i3-









The following correct/faulty values were obtained for a fixed
key ID (a47171...). The first faulty key (760e5d...) was
observed numerous times over different runs, while the second










EXAMPLES OF EREPORT FAULTS
All samples in this appendix were collected on the i3-
7100U-C running at 2 GHz with -134 mV of undervolting.































REFERENCE LAUNCH ENCLAVE IMPLEMENTATION
In this appendix, we provide the full C source code and
compiled assembly for the minimalist launch enclave applica-
tion scenario presented in Section V-A. We loosely based our
implementation on the open-source reference launch enclave
code (psw/ae/ref_le) provided by Intel as part of its SGX
SDK [35]. Our custom launch enclave enforces a simple
launch control policy by only returning valid launch tokens for
known enclave authors. Specifically, the enclave maintains a
global fixed-length array of known enclave authors (identified
by the respective MRSIGNER values) plus whether or not they
are allowed access to the long-term platform provisioning key.
After the global white list has been initialized to all zeroes,
our implementation should never return 1.




















* XXX the following array index compiles to a
* multiplication that can be faulted..
*/
ref_le_white_list_entry_t *current_entry = &
g_ref_le_white_list_cache[idx];
/*
* Our exemplary launch policy requires that the
* enclave author is white listed, plus is optionally










int get_launch_token(size_t *it, sgx_measurement_t mrsigner
, int provision)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < REF_LE_WL_SIZE; i++)
{




/* NOTE: we explicitly leak the loop iteration
* here for simplicity; real-world adversaries
* could use a #PF side-channel or count




/* For simplicity, we only return true or false and do
not compute the actual launch token. */
return 0;
}
For completeness, we also provide a disassembled version
of the relevant check_wl_entry function, as compiled with
gcc v7.4.0 (optimization level -Os):
check_wl_entry:
imul $0x21,%rdi,%rdi
push %rbp
push %rbx
lea g_ref_le_white_list_cache(%rip),%rbx
mov %edx,%ebp
mov $0x20,%edx
sub $0x8,%rsp
add %rdi,%rbx
mov %rbx,%rdi
callq memcmp
xor %edx,%edx
test %eax,%eax
jne 1f
test %ebp,%ebp
mov $0x1,%edx
je 1f
movzbl 0x20(%rbx),%edx
1:
mov %edx,%eax
pop %rdx
pop %rbx
pop %rbp
retq
